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6  The citizens’ response: Devolution and the Union
John Curtice and Ben Seyd

The previous chapter examined the impact the devolved institutions are thought to have had on the governance of Scotland and Wales. In so doing we considered in particular whether devolution was thought to have delivered some of the instrumental benefits it was hoped it would bring. Now we turn to a broader question: what impact has devolution had on attitudes towards the Union? Has devolution helped cement the Union by meeting the aspirations of people in Scotland and Wales for a measure of self-government? Or has it set the United Kingdom on a course that will eventually result in its dissolution?

Dissolution is certainly what many critics feared would be the ultimate consequence of devolution. By providing people in Scotland and Wales with political institutions that symbolised their distinctive national identity instead of their Britishness, devolution would fuel nationalist sentiment (Thatcher, 1998). By giving politicians in Scotland and Wales the opportunity to govern effectively, devolution would encourage the feeling in those countries that they could go it alone. Meanwhile, the highly asymmetric nature of a devolution settlement that granted a significant measure of self-rule to Scotland and Wales but denied it to England would generate an ‘English backlash’.  Such a backlash would, at best, put additional strains on the Union as people in England sought some form of devolution for themselves and would, at worst, lead to the Union’s demise as they demanded that Scotland and Wales should fend for themselves.

In contrast, many advocates of devolution argued the very opposite case (see, for example, Aughey, 2001; Bogdanor, 1999; Davies, 1999; Mackintosh, 1998). The creation of devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales would demonstrate to the people of those countries that their distinctive aspirations and identities could be accommodated within the framework of the Union. As a result, devolution would, in the memorable words of the former Shadow Scottish Secretary, George Robertson, kill nationalism ‘stone dead’.  Instead of fuelling demands for independence, the separatist cause would be denied the oxygen of discontent and resentment that was generated by the previous arrangements for governing Scotland and Wales.

Our aim in this chapter is to establish which of these two perspectives is the more accurate, now that the public has had nearly a decade of experience on which to judge the merits of devolution. We begin by examining trends in national identity in each of Scotland, Wales and England. Has the advent of devolution served to undermine whatever sense of Britishness existed hitherto in Scotland and Wales (Paterson et al., 2001: 101-2)? And has the creation of separate institutions in Scotland and Wales generated a reaction amongst people in England, encouraging them to think of themselves as English rather than British? We then consider people’s constitutional preferences. Has support for independence risen or declined in Scotland and Wales? Has the absence of devolved institutions in England generated resentment towards Scotland and Wales, or alternatively a demand that England should enjoy some form of devolution too? Finally, we consider possible pressures for change short of dismantling the framework of the current asymmetric devolution settlement. Do people in Scotland and in Wales want to see significant changes in the powers of their devolved institutions? And how far do people in England want to see some of the apparent anomalies thrown up by the asymmetric settlement removed?

The decline of Britishness?

National identity is often thought to provide the emotional ‘glue’ that helps keep a country together. People who share the same national identity are likely to be willing – indeed will positively wish – to be governed by the same set of political institutions (Gellner, 1983). They are also more likely to accept that they have an obligation to support each other in time of need (Miller, 2000).  So if people’s sense of Britishness were to decline, this would seem to pose a threat to their willingness to maintain the United Kingdom. 

There are two slightly different measures of national identity available to us in our surveys.  One measure simply asks respondents to examine an extensive list of possible national identities and to state which apply to themselves. Respondents may choose more than one, but in that event they are then asked to state which single one best applies to themselves. Although the list is extensive, most people choose British or one of the three sub-state national identities, that is English, Scottish or Welsh. So in Table 6.1, we show for each of England, Scotland and Wales, how many people have, when forced to choose a single identity, said they are British and how many said they are English/Scottish/Welsh as appropriate.

The results show different patterns in each of the three countries. In Scotland, adherence to a British national identity declined considerably during the then Mrs Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister. By the time people in Scotland were being asked in 1997 to vote in the devolution referendum, no more than one in five chose ‘British’ as their principal identity. However, since the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 there has not been any consistent trend. Annual readings have simply shown trendless fluctuations around a position where three-quarters of people in Scotland say they are Scottish and somewhat less than one in five say they are British. As one of us has suggested elsewhere, devolution in Scotland was more a product of, than a contributor to, a strengthening of a distinctive sense of national identity (Curtice, 2006).

In Wales, too, there is little sign that the creation of devolved institutions has been accompanied by a decline in British national identity. But in contrast to Scotland, it appears that Britishness did not decline either in the period before the introduction of devolution. As a result, although they are still a minority, the proportion of people in the principality who say they are British is, at around three in ten, substantially larger than the equivalent group in Scotland. Meanwhile, the proportion of people who say they are Welsh is typically close to twice that figure.





Still, it may be felt that forcing people to choose a single national identity is potentially misleading. Perhaps people hold, say, their Scottish identity in combination with a British identity. Failure to recognize that fact may lead us to understate the level of adherence to British national identity and to exaggerate the significance of the apparent decline we have identified in England. Our second measure known as the Moreno scale (Moreno, 1988), recognises the existence of dual identities by allowing people to choose one of a number of options that both permit people to deny they are British at all and to state that they feel both British and Scottish/Welsh/English. The measure reads:

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

Scottish/Welsh/English not British
More Scottish/Welsh/English than British
Equally Scottish/Welsh/English and British
More British than Scottish/Welsh/English
British not Scottish/Welsh/English





One conclusion is clear. The advent of devolution has not been accompanied by any strengthening of a sense of Britishness. But the more apocalyptic claims about its likely negative impact have not been fulfilled either. It certainly seems to be the case that Britishness has not been eroded in Scotland, not least because, by 1999, there were already so few who strongly adhered to that identity. In Wales, the evidence is somewhat inconsistent but certainly does not suggest a process of continuous decline. It is, ironically, in England where adherence to British national identity seems to have declined somewhat just as the devolved institutions were being created in 1999. But even here the change seems to have been a one-off event rather than the beginning of a continued fall.

Still, while British national identity might potentially be a glue that helps maintain public support for the Union, it is far from inevitable that those who say they are Scottish or Welsh want to leave the United Kingdom (Rosie and Bond, 2003). They may find it sufficient that their national identity is recognised in the form of devolved institutions. We thus now turn to more direct measures of people’s preferences for how the United Kingdom should be governed.

A slippery slope to independence?

The first survey measures we have capture attitudes towards the constitutional debate in Scotland and Wales. The measures differ slightly in the two countries. In Scotland, surveys ask people which of five possible constitutional positions they prefer, two of which refer to independence – either inside or outside the European Union – two to some form of devolution – either with or without taxation powers – while the last refers to staying inside the United Kingdom without having a devolved parliament. In Wales, the survey measures reflect the fact that, when established in 1999, the Welsh Assembly was denied primary legislative authority (as well as taxation powers). Thus, among the constitutional options offered to people in Wales, the first of the two devolution options refers to having a parliament with primary law making powers, while the second refers to an assembly with only ‘limited’ law making powers. The three remaining options are, however, the same as those in Scotland.


One important pattern is found in both Scotland and Wales (Table 6.3). Opposition to the creation of separate political institutions fell away as soon as they were established in 1999, and has remained relatively low ever since. This is particularly true in Wales, where the opposition to the creation of the Assembly came very close to being victorious in the 1997 referendum. Immediately after that referendum, over one third of people in Wales still said they opposed the creation of any kind of assembly. But by 1999, that figure had halved and has continued to fluctuate at around one in five ever since. In Scotland, the level of opposition has fallen from just under one in five to around one in ten. There seems to be little doubt that the idea of having distinctive political institutions has secured widespread assent within both Scotland and Wales.





With support for independence largely steady, but opposition to the creation of any kind of assembly or parliament lower from 1997 onwards, it comes as little surprise to learn that some form of devolution has consistently been the most popular option in both Scotland and Wales. Indeed, it has usually been backed by a majority. Although for a while, in 2004 and 2005, it looked as though support for devolution was declining in Scotland, by 2007 its popularity had been restored. Moreover, the vast majority of those in favour of devolution believe that the parliament should have some taxation powers. In Wales, by contrast, opinion has been more evenly divided between having an assembly without legislative and taxation powers and a parliament that does have such powers, albeit with opinion gradually moving in favour of the latter. We will return to the implications of this trend later in this chapter. 

But what does England think about the way that Scotland and Wales should be governed?  Survey questions on people’s preferred constitutional status for Scotland and Wales have been asked not only in these countries, but also among people in England.  This gives us an indication of any wish in England for Scotland or Wales to leave the Union, as well as public willingness to tolerate the existence of devolved bodies in Edinburgh and Cardiff.





Nor are people in England unhappy with the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales.  Indeed, since 1999, attitudes in England towards how Scotland and Wales should be governed have been remarkably similar to public opinion within those two countries. Usually a majority has expressed support for some form of devolution, with most backing taxation powers for the Scottish Parliament, while opinion on the best form of devolution for Wales is more evenly divided. However, there is one exception to this generalisation. In 2007, support in England for Scottish and Welsh devolution appears to have dropped somewhat, falling to a little below half in both cases. Perhaps this is a first sign of England’s patience beginning to wear a little thin. But we might note that, while the support for Scottish devolution fell between 2003 and 2007 by twelve points, and for Welsh devolution by ten, opposition to the existence of any kind of separate institutions for Scotland and Wales only increased by five points. The difference is accounted for by an increase in the proportion saying, ‘Don’t Know’ to our survey question. So instead of being a sign of growing resentment, the recent decline in support in England for Scottish and Welsh devolution may simply reflect a growing lack of interest.

There is also little sign that any growing resentment in England has fuelled a demand that England should have devolution too.  In contrast to Scotland and Wales, in England two very different models of devolution have vied with each for pre-eminence. One is that there should be a system of assemblies in each of England’s regions, a policy backed by the UK Labour Government until the first attempt to create such an assembly in the North East was defeated in a referendum in November 2004. The other is to create a parliament for the whole of England, with powers and responsibilities not dissimilar to those enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament, an idea spearheaded by the Campaign for an English Parliament. Thus in asking people in England how they would like to be governed, our surveys have presented both of these options together with the status quo of England being ‘governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK Parliament’. 





We might at this stage be wondering how it is possible for there to be continued apparent support for the maintenance of the United Kingdom given the far from overwhelming commitment to a common British national identity we identified earlier.  How, for example, can Scotland remain relatively content with remaining in the Union when four out of five prioritise their Scottish identity over any British one they may feel? Why is England apparently so little interested in devolution given that, even there, around two in five prioritise their sense of Englishness?









Still, the fact that the broad architecture of the asymmetric devolution settlement seems to fit the contours of public opinion across the United Kingdom does not necessarily mean that pressure for change is absent. We have already seen that, in Wales, more people now want to have a parliament with legislative and taxation powers than an assembly that largely lacks such powers. Indeed, this mood has already been reflected in changes to the devolution settlement in Wales. Under the terms of the Government of Wales Act 2006, the Westminster Parliament can grant the Welsh Assembly the right to legislate in specific areas, while provision is also made for a future referendum on giving the Assembly legislative powers similar to those of the Scottish Parliament. Perhaps in Scotland, too, there is pressure to increase the powers of the parliament; certainly a cross-party commission to consider that option has been established under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Calman. Meanwhile, although people in England may be broadly supportive of devolution for Scotland and Wales – albeit not wanting it for themselves – they may still feel unhappy about some of the apparent anomalies that arise as a result.

















For many of a unionist persuasion, especially those on the left, the idea that decisions about welfare benefits might be devolved is an anathema. To do so would cut across the notion that all citizens of the United Kingdom are entitled to the same social rights of citizenship. It would certainly constitute a radical change to the current devolution settlement. Yet this seems to be what people in Scotland and Wales want.  In saying they do not favour outright independence for their country (see Table 6.3), people in Scotland and Wales may simply be saying they do not see merit in their country having its own armed forces and pursuing its own foreign policy.  So far as domestic affairs are concerned, however, they may still have an appetite for Scotland and Wales taking their own decisions that extends well beyond the boundaries of the current devolution settlement.

So far as England is concerned, the current asymmetric devolution settlement is often thought to result in two unfair features in particular. The first is the so-called West Lothian Question.  As a result of the creation of the Scottish Parliament, laws for Scotland on devolved matters such as health and education are now made by that body rather than by Westminster. Nobody from England is represented in the Scottish Parliament. At the same time, the laws that apply in England to matters such as health and education are made by the UK Parliament in which MPs from Scotland do have a vote (for an extensive discussion of this issue, see Hazell, 2006). Moreover, the votes of Scottish MPs may even on occasion prove decisive, as they did, for example, in the passage of legislation on ‘top-up’ fees in higher education and the creation of foundation hospitals, neither of which policy was pursued in Scotland (Russell and Lodge, 2006). In short, MPs from England no longer have any say on devolved issues in Scotland, yet MPs from Scotland still have a say – and potentially a vital one – on equivalent matters in England. This would appear to be an anomaly that could easily cause resentment amongst people in England.

To establish whether this is the case we can examine the answers people in England have given when faced with the statement: 

Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the House of Commons on laws that only affect England.





In any event, this is not an issue that sets public opinion in England against that in Scotland. For, as we show in the bottom half of Table 6.11, people in Scotland also believe – albeit less strongly than those in England – that Scottish MPs should not vote on matters that only affect England. So the commitment of people in Scotland to the Union would not necessarily be undermined if such a change were introduced. That, of course, does not mean that restricting the voting rights of Scottish MPs would not be politically controversial, given that it would probably hinder the ability of a Labour government to secure the passage of English legislation more than the ability of a Conservative administration to do so.

A second apparent unfairness suffered by England is the fact that public expenditure per head in Scotland is some 20 per cent or so higher than in England, a difference not matched by higher tax receipts in Scotland. This disparity predates the current devolution settlement, but arguably it is potentially more salient now that the Scottish Parliament is free to determine the distribution of public expenditure in Scotland while having no responsibility under the devolution settlement to raise the money it spends.​[4]​ If, as has happened, Scotland introduces a benefit, such as ‘free’ personal care for older people, that is denied to people in England, it can be argued that the money of English taxpayers is being used to pay for a benefit that they themselves are denied. Such an argument might be expected to persuade people in England that Scotland gets more than its fair share of public expenditure.





Intriguingly, however, this change of perception has not been confined to England. It seems that the public in Scotland, too, have become more inclined to think that their country does relatively well out of the distribution of public expenditure. In 2000, nearly three in five (58 per cent) of people in Scotland felt that their country received less than its fair share; by 2007, only just over one in three (36%) shared that view. While people in Scotland are still only half as likely as their counterparts in England to believe that Scotland gets more than its fair share, perceptions on the two sides of the border are much closer to each other than they were in the early days of devolution. 





So while the broad architecture of the current devolution settlement appears to fit the varying contours of public opinion in Britain, this does not mean that the fit is a perfect one. Although the devolved institutions are now making a bigger impression, many people in both Scotland and in Wales still feel that their devolved institutions are insufficiently powerful. People in Wales appear to support granting primary legislative powers to their assembly, an issue on which they have been promised a vote by 2011 in the coalition agreement formed between Labour and Plaid Cymru after the 2007 election. In both Scotland and Wales, people are prepared to extend the competence of their devolved institutions to areas of domestic policy, such as welfare benefits, that are currently regarded as central to the remit of the UK government. 





We began this chapter by presenting two very different perspectives on the likely impact that devolution to Scotland and Wales would have on public support for the Union. One suggested that devolution would weaken that support, the other that it would strengthen it. Our analysis has not given much credence to either proposition.

Neither Scotland nor Wales seems any keener on independence now than it was in 1999. Nor is there any evidence that England has come to the view that the Union should be dissolved. Dismantling the Union remains the view of a minority, albeit a larger one in Scotland than elsewhere. Equally, there is no evidence that willingness to uphold a British identity has weakened in Scotland, in part because relatively few prioritised their British, over their Scottish, identity even before the Scottish Parliament was established.  In Wales the evidence is inconsistent. Only in England does adherence to a British, rather than an English, identity clearly seem to have suffered a clear drop.  But in any event, the view that British identity is an essential glue for the maintenance of the Union seems to be mistaken.

Equally, however, adherence to a British national identity has certainly not become more common since the advent of devolution. There has been no decline in support for independence for Scotland or Wales. Moreover, although most people in Scotland and Wales seem to want to stop short of independence, the appetite in both countries for extending the areas over which the devolved institutions have competence appears to be considerable. And although England continues to show little interest in devolution for itself, this does not mean that public support cannot be aroused for proposals to ‘correct’ some of the apparent anomalies of the current devolution settlement. 
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Note: Data for Wales in 1997 were obtained after the devolution referendum; those for Scotland and England were obtained after the UK general election.  Na  Not asked.
Sources: Scottish Election Studies, 1979-97; Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999-2007; Welsh Election Study 1979; Welsh Referendum Study 1997; Welsh Assembly Election Study 1999; Wales Life and Times Surveys, 2001-07; British Election Studies, 1992 and 1997; British Social Attitudes, 1999-2007








More Scottish than British	40	38	35	31	30	34	32	32	30
Equally Scottish and British	33	27	22	21	24	22	22	21	28
More British than Scottish	  3	  4	  3	  3	 3	  4	4	4	5




More Welsh than British	Na	26	19	Na	23	27	Na	Na	20
Equally Welsh and British	Na	34	37	Na	28	29	Na	Na	32
More British than Welsh	Na	10	  8	Na	11	  8	Na	Na	9
British not Welsh	Na	12	14	Na	11	  9	Na	Na	9
									
England									
English not British	Na	  7	17	19	17	17	Na	Na	19
More English than British	Na	17	15	14	13	19	Na	Na	14
Equally English and British	Na	45	37	34	42	31	Na	Na	31
More British than English	Na	14	11	14	  9	13	Na	Na	14
British not English	Na	  9	14	12	11	10	Na	Na	12
									

Notes: Data for Wales in 1997 were obtained after the devolution referendum; those for Scotland and England were obtained after the UK general election.  Na  Not asked.
Sources: Scottish Election Studies, 1992-97; Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999-2007; Welsh Referendum Study 1997; Welsh Assembly Election Study 1999; Wales Life and Times Surveys, 2001-07; British Election Study 1997; British Social Attitudes, 1999-2007








Devolution with tax powers	44	50	47	54	44	48	40	38	47	54
Devolution without tax powers	10	  8	  8	  6	  8	  7	  5	6	7	 8 
No devolution	18	 10	12	  9	12	13	17	14	9	9
										
Wales										
Independent in/out EU	13	  9	Na	12	Na	13	Na	Na	Na	12
Devolution with legislative/tax powers	18	35	Na	37	Na	36	Na	Na	Na	42




Sources: Scottish Election Study 1997; Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999-2007; Welsh Referendum Study 1997; Welsh Assembly Election Study 1999; Wales Life and Times Surveys, 2001-07







Devolution with tax powers	38	44	44	53	51	36





Devolution with legislative/tax powers	37	34	35	39	37	29

















Note: In 2004-06, the regional assemblies were described as bodies that make ‘decisions about the region’s economy, planning and housing’, while in other years they were introduced as bodies that run ‘services like health’. The 2003 survey carried both versions of this option and demonstrated that the different wording did not make a material difference to the response pattern.
Source: British Social Attitudes, 1999-2007 (respondents in England only)






Independent in/out EU	28	  6
Devolution with tax powers	52	60
Devolution without tax powers	  7	  9
No devolution	  7	21
		
Wales		
Independent in/out EU	13	  9
Devolution with legislative/tax powers	49	31









Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes 2007, Wales Life and Times 2007, British Social Attitudes 2007






Which tier has most influence in Scotland:							
Scottish Parliamenta 	13	15	17	19	23	24	28
UK government at Westminster	66	66	64	48	47	38	47
Local councils in Scotland	10	  9	  7	20	15	18	  8
European Union	  4	  7	  5	  6	8	11	  9
							
Which tier has most influence in Wales:							
Welsh Assembly 	Na	17	21	Na	Na	Na	33
UK government at Westminster	Na	61	53	Na	Na	Na	50
Local councils in Wales	Na	14	13	Na	Na	Na	  5
European Union	Na	  3	  4	Na	Na	Na	  5
							

Note: a Since 2005, the question referred to the ‘Scottish Executive’ rather than the ‘Scottish Parliament’. The 2004 survey carried both versions of this option and demonstrated that the different wording did not make a material difference to the response pattern; the figures for 2004 are the results for the two wordings combined.  Na Not asked.
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes, 2000-07; Wales Life and Times Surveys, 2001-07






Which tier ought to have most influence in Scotland:								
Scottish Parliamenta	74	72	74	66	67	67	64	71
UK government at Westminster	13	13	14	20	12	13	11	14
Local councils in Scotland	  8	  10	  8	  9	17	15	19	9
European Union	  1	   1	  1	  1	  1	 1	1	1
								
Which tier ought to have most influence in Wales:								
Welsh Assembly	59	Na	54	54	Na	Na	Na	72
UK government at Westminster	24	Na	25	27	Na	Na	Na	17
Local councils in Wales	11	Na	16	13	Na	Na	Na	8
European Union	  1	Na	  1	  1	Na	Na	Na	*
								

Note:  a  See note to Table 6.7.  *  Less than 1 per cent.  Na Not asked.
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999-2007; Welsh Assembly Election Study 1999; Wales Life and Times Surveys, 2001-07


Table 6.9  Attitudes towards the powers of the Scottish Parliament, 1999-2007







Strongly disagree	  4	  5	  4	  6	  5	  3
						






Table 6.10  Who should make most of the important decisions for Scotland/Wales, 2007












Defence and foreign affairs	21	72
		

Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes 2007; Wales Life and Times 2007








Neither agree nor disagree	19	18	18	16
Disagree	  8	12	10	10





Neither agree nor disagree	17	21	29	26
Disagree	19	16	18	18
Strongly disagree	  4	  8	  5	  4
				

Sources: British Social Attitudes, 2000-07; Scottish Social Attitudes,2000-07.
















Sources: British Social Attitudes, 2000-07; Scottish Social Attitudes ,2000-07








Neither agree nor disagree	12	12	14
Disagree	11	10	  5
Strongly disagree	  1	  0	  1
			
People in Scotland			
Strongly agree	  7	  5	8
Agree	45	46	49
Neither agree nor disagree	18	16	16
Disagree	24	25	20
Strongly disagree	  3	  4	  2
			














^1	  These figures receive further support from the answers given to an additional question asked in 2007 only. This found that just 16 per cent of people in England believed it would be in England’s interest to become independent of the rest of the United Kingdom.
^2	  It is notable that, despite its weaker powers, the Welsh Assembly is as likely to be regarded as having the most influence in Wales as the devolved institutions are in Scotland.
^3	  Unfortunately, a similar question has not been asked on the Welsh surveys.
^4	  The Scottish Parliament does have the ability to vary the basic rate of income tax by up to 3p in the pound. However, in 1999, the estimated revenue of an extra 3p in the pound was just £450m, well short of the then £16bn annual budget of the Parliament (Heald and McLeod, 2006: 76).
